Court Declined to Create a Public Policy Exception for Wrongful Termination of an At Will Employee Based on the Misuse of Medical Information

In the at-will employee wrongful discharge case of Yellovich v. Ahold USA, PICS Case No. 14-1943 (E.D. Pa., Nov. 24, 2014) the Honorable Berle M. Schiller declined to create a public policy exception for wrongful termination of an at-will employee based on the misuse of medical information. The district court also dismissed a negligent misrepresentation claim based on the failure to complete a promise and an insufficiently plead defamation claim. The Defendant’s motion to dismiss was granted and denied in part.

Plaintiff commenced this action against his former employer, Ahold USA, alleging a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, wrongful discharge, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, promissory estoppel and defamation. Plaintiff alleged that after he was involuntarily hospitalized and diagnosed with a mood disorder, his manager, Shelly Griffith, told him he could either resign or be fired. Griffith allegedly represented that if plaintiff resigned, defendant would not contest unemployment benefits and plaintiff could reapply for a job within six months and be rehired.

However, after plaintiff resigned, defendant contested his unemployment benefits and did not rehire him when he reapplied. Plaintiff applied for jobs at Home Depot and Lowe’s and alleged he was “extremely well qualified.” Lowe’s was initially quite enthusiastic about plaintiff. However, neither store interviewed him. Plaintiff alleged, on information and belief, that when these stores contacted defendant, one of defendant’s employees defamed plaintiff, so that neither company was interested in hiring plaintiff. Defendant moved to dismiss all counts except the Rehabilitation Act count.

Regarding the wrongful discharge claim, the court declined to create a public policy exception for wrongful termination of an at-will employee based on the misuse of medical information. Pennsylvania case law generally has limited public policy exceptions to instances in which an employee was discharged for fulfilling a statutory duty or exercising a constitutional right. It was unclear here whether plaintiff’s medical information was confidential. The complaint states plaintiff volunteered the information to his manager.

The court also dismissed plaintiff’s negligent misrepresentation count based on defendant’s failure to complete the promise to rehire him. Although negligent misrepresentation has been described as a lesser included claim of fraudulent misrepresentation, it differs from fraud in that negligent misrepresentation cannot be based on a false promise. While Pennsylvania law was not settled on the point, the district court found no reason to depart from the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that do not allow claims fro negligent misrepresentation to be based on false promises of future conduct.

Plaintiff’s defamation claim was dismissed as insufficiently pled and conclusory. An essential element of defamation in Pennsylvania is showing the defamatory nature of the statement made. Claiming only that defendant had defamed plaintiff did not suffice. Plaintiff did not know whether anyone at Lowe’s or Home Depot ever spoke with anyone representing defendant, much less the content of any conversations. Although Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the exact point, other jurisdictions agree that a defamation claim requires at least slightly more detail.

The court declined to dismiss the fraud count. First, a future act can be the basis for a fraud claim. Plaintiff sufficiently alleged defendant’s representations about not challenging his unemployment benefits and rehiring him were false when made. The allegations were pled with sufficient particularity, including the date and place Griffith made the alleged fraudulent misrepresentations. Further, fraud claims may be stated in the at-will employment context. The weight of authority is that an at-will employee may state a claim for fraud, even if the employer could have terminated the employee at any time.

Plaintiff’s allegations also were sufficient to make out prima facie case for promissory estoppel. Plaintiff was not claiming defendant was estopped from terminating him; rather, he alleged he reasonably relied on promises that if he resigned defendant would not contest unemployment benefits and would rehire him.

Reference: Digest of Recent Opinions, Pennsylvania Law Weekly, 37 PLW 1183 (December 9, 2014)

Filed Under: Employment Law; At Will Employee; Wrongful Discharge

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